What Just Happened
On February 6, 2026, a two-judge majority of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed two district courts and held that INA § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires the mandatory detention of noncitizens "seeking admission" to the United States — with no right to bond hearings.
Judge Edith Jones, joined by Judge Duncan, ruled that noncitizens who entered without inspection and were placed in removal proceedings are "seeking admission" and must be detained without the possibility of release on bond. Judge Douglas dissented sharply.
The consolidated cases — Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi (S.D. Tex.) and Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara (W.D. Tex.) — both involved individuals who entered the United States, were apprehended, placed in removal proceedings, and sought habeas corpus relief arguing they were entitled to bond hearings.
The district courts agreed with the detainees. The Fifth Circuit reversed.
The Statutory Question
Everything turns on three words: "seeking admission."
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act says that if a noncitizen who is an "applicant for admission" is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, they "shall be detained" for removal proceedings. The government argues this covers everyone placed in § 1229a proceedings who hasn't been formally admitted. The detainees argue that "seeking admission" means affirmatively presenting at a port of entry — not someone who crossed the border covertly and was caught.
The Judicial Scoreboard
This is the statistic that makes the ruling extraordinary. Before today, the government's position had been rejected by the overwhelming majority of federal judges who considered it.
The dissent (Judge Douglas) catalogs these figures in footnote 15, citing a habeas tracker maintained by the Innovation Law Lab as of January 26, 2026. The majority opinion acknowledges "roughly 350 district court decisions" went against the government (Slip Op. at 6).
Put differently: the Fifth Circuit panel majority has now adopted a position that roughly 92% of federal district judges who ruled on the question rejected. This is not a close call that the circuit court weighed in on — it is a dramatic reversal of near-unanimous lower-court consensus.
The Majority: Jones, Joined by Duncan
Judge Edith Jones, joined by Judge Duncan, writes the majority opinion. The core reasoning proceeds in two steps:
Step 1: "Applicant for Admission" = "Seeking Admission"
The majority holds that § 1225(a)(1) defines "applicant for admission" to include every noncitizen "present in the United States who has not been admitted." Under this reading, anyone who entered without inspection is automatically an applicant for admission.
Jones argues this is textually compelled: Congress defined the term in 1996 (IIRIRA) and expanded it beyond the old "entry doctrine." The statute doesn't distinguish between someone who presents at a port of entry and someone apprehended after crossing the border.
Step 2: Mandatory Detention Under § 1225(b)(2)(A)
Once someone is an "applicant for admission," and they aren't clearly entitled to be admitted, the statute says they "shall be detained." Jones reads "shall" as mandatory — no bond, no discretionary release.
The majority equates "applicant for admission" in § 1225(a)(1) with "seeking admission" in § 1225(b)(2)(A), treating the phrases as interchangeable. This collapses any distinction between voluntary and involuntary applicants for admission — the linchpin the dissent attacks.
What About INA § 1226? (The Bond Statute)
The petitioners argued they should be processed under § 1226, which governs detention of aliens "pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed" and allows bond hearings. The majority says § 1226 applies only to individuals already admitted — not to applicants for admission under § 1225. Since these individuals were never "admitted," § 1225's mandatory detention controls.
How Does the Majority Handle the 350+ Contrary Decisions?
Dismissively. Jones acknowledges the volume but says the lower courts committed "fundamental analytic error" by confusing physical presence with admission status. She describes the district court consensus as the result of a "cascade" of copy-paste reasoning that doesn't engage the statutory text correctly.
The Jennings v. Rodriguez Argument
The majority leans heavily on Jennings v. Rodriguez (2018), in which the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional avoidance reading that would have implied bond hearings into § 1225(b). Jones reads Jennings as strongly signaling that § 1225(b) means what it says: mandatory detention with no bond.
The Dissent: Judge Douglas
Judge Douglas writes a 22-page dissent that attacks the majority at every level — textual, structural, and doctrinal.
The Core Textual Argument
Douglas argues that "seeking admission" is not the same as "applicant for admission." Congress used both phrases in the INA, and they mean different things. "Seeking admission" implies affirmative, voluntary conduct — presenting yourself at a port of entry. "Applicant for admission" is the broader statutory umbrella term. The majority collapses this distinction.
If Congress meant "applicant for admission" in § 1225(b)(2)(A), it would have said "applicant for admission." It said "seeking admission" — a narrower, conduct-based phrase. — Judge Douglas, dissenting
The Elephants-in-Mouseholes Doctrine
Douglas invokes the Supreme Court's "elephants in mouseholes" principle: Congress does not hide major policy changes in ambiguous statutory language. If Congress intended to authorize indefinite mandatory detention of potentially millions of people with no judicial review, it would have said so explicitly.
The dissent emphasizes the real-world consequences: the government's interpretation would mandate detention — with no bond, no release, no hearing — for every noncitizen in the country who entered without inspection, including longtime residents. As of 2022, an estimated 10.5–11.5 million people fit this definition. This is not a "mousehole."
The Structural Problem
Douglas identifies what she calls a structural incoherence in the majority's reading: if § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates detention of all unadmitted noncitizens, then § 1226 has no function. Why would Congress create a parallel detention statute with bond hearing provisions if § 1225 already mandated detention for the same population?
The Due Process Shadow
Although the majority avoids the constitutional question, Douglas notes the elephant in the room: indefinite mandatory detention without judicial review raises serious Fifth Amendment due process concerns. She cites Zadvydas v. Davis (2001), in which the Supreme Court read an implicit reasonableness limitation into a detention statute to avoid constitutional problems. The majority's reading invites the very constitutional challenge the Supreme Court has tried to avoid.
The Dissent's Judge Count
Footnote 15 of the dissent provides the most detailed accounting: within the Fifth Circuit alone, 29 district judges ruled for the petitioners, with only 6 ruling for the government. Across 105 cases for petitioners versus 31 for the government. Nationally, the ratio is even more lopsided — 350+ to roughly 27.
Majority vs. Dissent: Side by Side
| Issue | Majority (Jones + Duncan) | Dissent (Douglas) |
|---|---|---|
| "Seeking admission" = "applicant for admission"? | Yes. Same thing. Congress defined the term in § 1225(a)(1) to include all unadmitted aliens. | No. Different phrases, different meanings. "Seeking admission" requires affirmative conduct. |
| Role of § 1226 | Only applies to admitted aliens. Not relevant here. | § 1226 is the default detention provision for most removal proceedings. Majority's reading makes it superfluous. |
| 350+ contrary decisions | "Fundamental analytic error" cascading through the district courts. | Near-unanimous consensus reflecting the correct reading. |
| Elephants in mouseholes | Not addressed directly. | Congress doesn't hide mandatory mass detention in ambiguous language. |
| Due process | Constitutional question not reached. | The interpretation creates obvious Fifth Amendment problems; Zadvydas counsels avoidance. |
| Practical scope | The statute means what it says. Policy consequences are for Congress. | Would mandate detention of 10.5+ million people. Operationally impossible. |
What Happens Now
This ruling does not end the fight. Several things will happen in short order:
- En banc petition: The losing parties are virtually certain to petition for rehearing en banc by the full Fifth Circuit. Given that 29 of 35 district judges in the circuit ruled the other way, this will be closely watched.
- Circuit split: Other circuits have not yet ruled. If another circuit reaches the opposite conclusion, a Supreme Court grant of certiorari becomes nearly inevitable.
- Supreme Court: Even without a split, the scale of the question (potentially millions of people, 350+ contrary rulings) may attract Supreme Court review on its own.
- Practical enforcement: ICE and DHS detention capacity is finite. Mandatory detention of all unadmitted noncitizens is operationally impossible at scale, regardless of what the statute says.
This page will be updated as the case progresses. The en banc petition, any stays, and Supreme Court developments will be tracked here.
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